College of Management, Guizhou University

以利益相关者理论和双元创新理论为基础,利用动态博弈分析和面板门槛检验研究了环境规制与绿色创新瓶颈之间的内在联系。通过构建“地方政府—制造企业”两阶段动态博弈模型,分别总结了制造企业在严格环境规制、宽松环境规制下选择积极绿色创新或谨慎绿色创新的纳什均衡条件。再利用面板门槛模型,选取中国31个省份1092家制造业上市公司数据,实证研究了地方政府环境规制强度对制造企业绿色创新投入的瓶颈效应,从而进一步验证了博弈模型的现实有效性。研究发现:环境规制政策在激励被规制企业绿色转型的过程中会造成上游原材料涨价,并产生抑制企业创新意愿的绿色成本瓶颈;绿色转型企业由“渐进式创新”到“突破式创新”的技术跨越往往伴随着生产方式的巨大变革,并会导致企业无法适应而产生绿色技术瓶颈。基于以上分析,围绕供应链布局、创新网络建设和科技金融协同等提出对策建议。

Based on stakeholder theory and ambidextrous innovation theory, this paper uses dynamic game analysis and panel threshold test to study the intrinsic link between environmental regulation and green innovation bottlenecks. By constructing a two-stage dynamic game model of “ local government- manufacturing enterprise” , the paper summarizes the Nash equilibrium conditions for manufacturing en- terprises to choose proactive green innovation or cautious green innovation under strict or loose environ- mental regulation. Then, using panel threshold model and data from 1, 092 listed manufacturing compa- nies in 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in China, the paper empirically studies the bottleneck effect of local government environmental regulation intensity on manufacturing enterprise green innovation input, thus further verifying the practical validity of the game model. The study finds that: environmental regulation policies will cause upstream raw material prices to rise and produce green cost bottlenecks that inhibit enterprise innovation willingness in the process of encouraging regu- lated enterprises to transform green; that green transformation enterprises from “ incremental innova- tion” to “ radical innovation” often accompanied by huge changes in production mode, and will lead to green technology bottlenecks that enterprises cannot adapt to. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions around supply chain layout, innovation network construc- tion and science and technology finance coordination.

国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国共产党科技创新思想体系研究”(20BDJ006)