School of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University
School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University
Zhejiang Ecological Civilization Academy

碳核查制度中的信息不对称问题导致了寻租现象的滋生,不仅损害了公众权益,还严重阻碍了中国温室气体排放控制方案的实施。因此,迫切需要对碳核查中的寻租行为进行有效治理。针对这一问题,构建了基于区块链技术的随机演化博弈模型,利用IT^o随机微分方程分析了政府、控排企业与核查机构三方博弈主体策略均衡的稳定性条件,并通过数值模拟考察了企业上链成本、政府补贴、政府惩罚、寻租成本、随机扰动等因素对参与主体策略选择的影响。研究结果表明:区块链技术有助于减少碳核查中的寻租现象,政府的奖惩措施有助于推进区块链碳核查体系的建设,而区块链所产生的掩饰成本能有效减弱碳核查中的寻租问题。研究丰富了碳核查寻租治理理论,并为碳核查寻租的有效治理提出了具体对策建议。

The asymmetry of information inherent in the carbon verification system has led to rent-see- king behaviors, which not only infringe upon public interests but also severely impede the implementa- tion of China’ s greenhouse gas emission control plans. Therefore, it is imperative to effectively manage rent-seeking behaviors within the carbon verification process. To address this issue, this study constructs a stochastic evolutionary game model based on blockchain governance. Using Ito stochastic differential equations, it analyzes the stability conditions of the equilibrium strategies among the three main actors: the government, emission-regulating enterprises, and verification institutions. Additionally, it examines the effects of factors such as enterprise on-chain costs, government subsidies, government penalties, rent-seeking costs, and random disturbances on the strategic choices of these actors through numerical simulations. The findings indicate that blockchain technology helps reduce rent-seeking behaviors in carbon verification; that government incentives and penalties facilitate the construction of a blockchain- based carbon verification system, and the concealment costs generated by blockchain can effectively mitigate rent-seeking issues. This research enriches the theoretical framework for managing rent-seeking in carbon verification and offers practical policy recommendations for its effective governance.

浙江省自然科学基金项目“基于区块链技术的产品标准链创新机制研究”(LY21G020005)