School of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University
Zhejiang Academy of Commerce
School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University

为解决产品标准体系建设中的标准冲突、标准不匹配等问题,文中构建了一个基于区块链技术的产品标准链模型,并运用演化博弈方法分析政府行为对于企业参与产品标准链建设的影响。在设计了政府监督、政府补贴与惩罚机制基础上,分析了政府行为作用下的标准链建设演化博弈均衡,探究各稳态均衡的存在条件。研究结果发现,无政府参与时企业会选择不上链策略,此时需要政府干预企业上链行为;政府补贴会促进企业上链积极性,当更多的企业选择上链时,会促使没有上链的企业更改策略,形成“正向循环”;当50%左右的企业采取“投机”行为会受到惩罚时,政府与企业的策略将向建设标准链演化。区块链作为新兴技术,在产业链中的应用需要政府行为支持,政府行为对推进标准链建设具有重要意义。

To address issues such as standard conflicts and mismatches in the construction of productstandard systems, this article constructs a product standard chain model based on blockchain and usesevolutionary game theory to analyze the impact of government behavior on enterprise participation in theproduct standard chain. On the basis of designing government supervision, government subsidies, andpunishment mechanisms, the article analyzes the evolutionary game equilibrium of standard chain construction under the influence of government behavior and explores the existence conditions of eachsteady-state equilibrium. The results show that when there is no government participation, enterpriseswill choose not to go on the chain strategy, and in this case, the government needs to intervene in theenterpris’ s going on the chain behavior; that government subsidies will promote the enthusiasm of enterprises to go online; that when more enterprises choose to go online, it will encourage companies thathave not gone online to change their strategies, forming a “ positive cycle” ; and that when around 50%of enterprises engage in “ speculative” behavior and are punished, the strategy of the government andenterprises will evolve towards building a standard chain. As an emerging technology, the application ofblockchain in the industrial chain requires government action support, which is of great significance forpromoting the construction of standard chains.

浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY21G020005);教育部后期资助项目(20JHQ060);浙江省普通本科高校“十四五”教学改革项目(jg20220488)