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主办单位:煤炭科学研究总院有限公司、中国煤炭学会学术期刊工作委员会
计及碳捕集的虚拟电厂参与电-碳耦合市场的竞价策略研究
  • Title

    A study of bidding strategies for virtual power plants with carbon capture to participate in the coupled electricity-carbon market

  • 作者

    许晓敏贠嘉琦牛东晓张忠贵

  • Author

    XU Xiaomin;YUAN Jiaqi;NIU Dongxiao;ZHANG Zhonggui

  • 单位

    华北电力大学经济与管理学院

  • Organization
    School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University
  • 摘要
    在“双碳”目标下,碳捕集与封存技术(CCS)可有效降低碳排放,但会影响经济性。针对考虑计及碳捕集的虚拟电厂(VPP)参与电-碳耦合市场的竞价问题,基于Stackelberg博弈模型,建立了计及碳捕集的VPP参与能量、备用市场和碳交易的双层竞价模型。首先分析了耦合电-碳市场的模式;其次,建立VPP净发电量、净碳排放量、碳排放额模型;然后建立双层竞价模型,上层领导者为VPP运营商,以利润最大化为目标,下层跟随者为电力市场运营商调度和交易中心(DATC),以整个市场福利最大化为目标;最后采用分支定界法和粒子群算法转化求解。通过算例验证,该模型可以为计及碳捕集的虚拟电厂参与电-碳耦合市场竞价提供最优竞价策略,具有合理性和有效性。
  • Abstract
    Under the dual carbon target, carbon capture and storage can effectively reduce carbon emissions, but will affect economic efficiency. For the problem of VPP (virtual power plant) participating in the energy, reserve market, and carbon trading in the electricity-carbon coupling market considering carbon capture, a double-layer bidding model considering carbon capture was established based on the Stackelberg game model. Firstly, this paper analyzes the mode of the coupled electricity-carbon market; secondly, the net generation, net carbon emissions, and carbon emission quota models of the VPP are established; then, the double-layer bidding model is established, with the leader being the VPP operator and the follower being the dispatching and trading center (DATC) of the power market operator; finally, the problem is solved by the branch-and-bound method and the particle swarm optimization algorithm. Through the example verification, the model can provide the optimal bidding strategy for the VPP participating in the electricity-carbon coupling market considering carbon capture, which is reasonable and effective.
  • 关键词

    虚拟电厂碳捕集技术电-碳耦合市场Stackelberg博弈分支定界法

  • KeyWords

    virtual power plant;carbon capture technology;electricity-carbon coupling market;Stackelberg game;branch-and-bound method

  • 基金项目(Foundation)
    国家社会科学基金重大项目(ZX20220266);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72472050);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(24YJA630115)
  • 引用格式
    许晓敏, 贠嘉琦, 牛东晓, 张忠贵. 计及碳捕集的虚拟电厂参与电-碳耦合市场的竞价策略研究. 煤炭经济研究. 2025, 45(1): 151-159
  • Citation
    XU Xiaomin, YUAN Jiaqi, NIU Dongxiao, ZHANG Zhonggui. A study of bidding strategies for virtual power plants with carbon capture to participate in the coupled electricity-carbon market. Coal Economic Research. 2025, 45(1): 151-159
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