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主办单位:煤炭科学研究总院有限公司、中国煤炭学会学术期刊工作委员会
补贴退坡下新能源汽车发展演化博弈研究
  • Title

    Research on evolutionary game of new energy vehicle development under decliningsubsidies

  • 作者

    刘小凡刘满芝王赛

  • Author

    LIU Xiaofan;LIU Manzhi;WANG Sai

  • 单位

    徐州徐工基础工程机械有限公司中国矿业大学 经济管理学院

  • Organization
    Foundation Construction Machinery Co., Ltd, Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group
    School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology
  • 摘要
    新能源汽车作为国家“十二五”规划重大发展战略之一,其可持续性成为影响产业升级与发展的重要因素。近年来政府提供给新能源汽车制造商和消费者的补贴呈现递减的趋势,是否会影响新能源汽车产业的发展?以新能源汽车产业为背景,构建政府、制造商和消费者的演化博弈模型,并在政府补贴退坡情景下分析制造商与消费者两方演化博弈过程。收集2018—2021年新能源汽车产业相关的市场产销量与补贴额等数据,使用Matlab对博弈模型进行数值仿真。结果表明:政府补贴的退坡对制造商的影响程度高于对消费者的影响;电池续航和充电便捷性以及油价能够影响消费者购买决策的变化,且电池续航和充电便捷性的影响程度相对更大;油价上涨与新能源技术提升对产业发展带来的正效用高于政府补贴退坡造成的负效用。新能源汽车产业的长期发展更多要靠消费者需求来拉动,也要靠制造商不断进行产业升级与技术提升来推动。
  • Abstract
    As one of the developing strategies since "The Twelfth Five-Year Plan", the sustainability of new energy vehicles has become an important factor affecting industrial upgrading and development. Will the decrease of government′s subsidies affect the development of new energy vehicle industry? Taking new energy vehicle industry as the background, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government, manufacturer and consumer, and analyzes the evolutionary game process between manufacturer and consumer under the scenario of subsidies reduction. In addition, this paper collects the market production and sales volume and subsidy amount related to the new energy vehicle industry from 2018 to 2021, and carry outnumerical simulation of the game model. The results show that the impact of government subsidies on manufacturer is higher than that on consumers. Battery life and charging convenience, as well as gasoline price, can influence consumers′ purchasing decisions. Battery life and charging convenience cause the greater impact compared with other factors. The positive effect of rising gasoline price and the improvement of new energy technology on industrial development is higher than the negative effect caused by the withdrawal of government subsidies. The long-term development of the new energy vehicle industry not only depends on consumer demand, but also depends on manufacturers′ continuous industrial upgrading and technological innovation.
  • 关键词

    新能源汽车演化博弈可持续发展补贴退坡数值仿真

  • KeyWords

    new energy vehicle;evolutionary game;sustainable development;subsidy reduction;numerical simulation

  • 基金项目(Foundation)
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(72374197, 71874186);中国矿业大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2023ZDPYSK03, 2023SKHQ03)
  • 引用格式
    刘小凡, 刘满芝, 王赛. 补贴退坡下新能源汽车发展演化博弈研究. 煤炭经济研究. 2025, 45(2): 142-152
  • Citation
    LIU Xiaofan, LIU Manzhi, WANG Sai. Research on evolutionary game of new energy vehicle development under decliningsubsidies. Coal Economic Research. 2025, 45(2): 142-152
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