为探讨“双碳”目标下对重污染企业漂绿行为的治理,运用动态博弈分析法构建了政府干预与不干预、企业实施漂绿行为与不实施漂绿行为,以及政府干预情形下,补助、补助+激励、补助+激励+惩罚模式下的两方3阶段模型。结果表明:政府的行为能显著影响企业的行为,同时也会受到企业行为的影响,对于政府来说,是否会采取干预的策略,主要与自由市场下漂绿治理程度,以及实施干预措施所要付出的成本和干预带来的总社会效益有关;对于企业来说,是否会实施漂绿取决于不漂绿所要遭受的总损失和参与成本之和与带来利益的比较。为了更好地实现“双碳”目标及可持续高质量发展,企业应避免机会主义的寻租行为,积极承担社会责任,践行低碳绿色转型;政府应优化外部环境和完善法律法规,分阶段、分措施治理漂绿行为。

To explore the governance of heavy polluting enterprises’ greenwashing under the “ dual carbon” goal, a two-party three-stage dynamic game model between government and enterprise is established. The action profile involves three stages: government intervention or not, enterprise’ s takinggreenwashing or not and three modes of government intervention, subsidies, subsidies and incentives;subsidies, incentives and punishments. The research shows that government behavior can significantlyinfluence the behavior of businesses, and vice versa. For the government, whether it will adopt intervention strategies is related mainly to the degree of green governance in the free market, the cost of implementing intervention measures, and the overall social benefits brought by intervention. For enterprises,whether they will implement greenwashing or not depends on the total losses and participation costs incurred without greenwashing, compared to the benefits it could bring. In order to achieve the “ doublecarbon” goal and sustainable high-quality development, enterprises should avoid opportunistic rent-seeking behavior, actively assume social responsibility, and carry out low-carbon green transformation. Thegovernment should optimize the external environment and improve laws and regulations, as well as control greenwashing in stages and measures.