College of Information Management, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics
Accounting College, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics

基于中国“富煤少油”的基本国情和国内能源需求逐年递增的现象,煤电产业链上下游企业在节能减排的大前提下稳步发展,但仍需考虑多方因素以维持发展,其中政府规制力度和产业链的市场势力测度可以作为企业策略抉择的主要影响因素。为了促使“双碳”目标在煤电产业链中积极稳定的落实,在推动国内经济快速发展的同时保障煤炭企业低碳发展和电力企业新能源发电策略选择。基于博弈模型基本假设与参数设置以及支付矩阵,开展了政府规制下煤电双企在低碳发展策略选择的三方演化博弈,且对电煤市场中的煤炭和电力上市公司财务报表进行市场势力测度的实证分析。结果表明:①中国的煤炭和电力企业存在市场势力效应,占据优势电煤市场的企业会因为“熊皮特效应”减少技术创新支出,不占据优势的企业会因为“逃离竞争效应”选择发展低碳生产技术获得更多政府补贴。②实证分析煤炭和电力企业在2002—2021年4个阶段的市场势力溢价分别为:1.339、1.058、0.906、1.148和2.086、1.279、1.896、1.367。政府在相对市场势力过高时强力规制市场借此消除煤电矛盾推动煤电一体化进程。③双碳目标下中国未来能源产业结构如何调整,其中不仅需要政府出台有力措施进行产业规则,更需要从煤电产业链内部进行消除电煤矛盾,使得煤电双企处于良好合作共赢环境从而趋向选择稳定的节能减排发展策略。

Based on the basic national conditions of China′s " rich coal and less oil" situation and the increasing domestic energy demandyear by year, upstream and downstream enterprises in the coal power industry chain are steadily developing under the premise of energyconservation and emission reduction. Multiple factors need to be considered, among which government regulation and market powermeasurement of the industry chain can be the main influencing factors for enterprise strategic choices. In order to promote the active andstable implementation of the " dual carbon" goal in the coal power industry chain, while promoting the rapid development of the domesticeconomy, ensuring the low - carbon development of coal enterprises and the selection of new energy generation strategies for powerenterprises. Based on the basic assumption and parameter setting of game theovy with the payment matrix, this article conducts a tripartiteevolutionary game on the selection of low-carbon development strategies for coal and electricity companies under government regulation,and conducts empirical analysis on market power measurement based on the financial statements of coal and electricity listed companies inthe electricity coal market. The results indicate that: ① China's coal and power enterprises have a market power effect. Enterprisesoccupying the dominant electric coal market will reduce their technological innovation expenditures due to the " Schumpeter effect" , whileenterprises not occupying the advantage will choose to develop low-carbon production technologies and receive more government subsidiesdue to the " escape from competition effect" . ② Empirical analysis shows that the market power premiums of coal and power enterprisesin the four stages from 2002 to 2021 are 1. 339, 1. 058, 0. 906, and 1. 148, respectively; 2. 086, 1. 279, 1. 896 and 1. 367. Thegovernment forcefully regulates the market when the relative market power is too high, in order to eliminate the contradiction between coaland electricity and promote the integration process of coal and electricity. ③ How to adjust the structure of China's future energy industryunder the dual carbon goal, which not only requires the government to introduce strong measures to regulate the industry, but also needs toeliminate the contradiction between electricity and coal from within the coal power industry chain, so that the coal power enterprises are in agood cooperative and win-win environment and tend to choose stable energy-saving and emission reduction development strategies.